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“With home-bred hordes the hillsides teem
The troopships bring us one by one,
At vast expense of time and steam
To slay Afridis where they run
The ‘captives of the bow and spear’
Are cheap alas! as we are dear.”
— Rudyard Kipling,
“Arithmetic on the Frontier”

A

merican policy in Afghanistan is at a crossroads, or so it appears. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested in May 2003 that the war
on terror in Afghanistan was in “cleanup” or “mop up” phase.1 Overshadowed
by the swift American military victory in Iraq, the images of airmobile troops
and special operations forces rooting out al Qaeda in remote Afghanistan
mountains took a back seat to images of M1A1 Abrams tanks sweeping
through the desert destroying Iraq’s Republican Guard. Indeed, by the end of
2003, the problematic aspects of the American-led reconstruction effort in
Iraq continued to dominate discourse.
At the same time, critics darkly hinted that Afghanistan was “another
Vietnam” when aspects of the ongoing but low-level Taliban terrorist activities
popped up in the media in the fall of 2003. Those seeking to attack American
reconstruction policy in Iraq point to Afghanistan and claim that it is somehow
a failed prototype, that the credibility of the American reconstruction effort in
Iraq is somehow linked to the credibility of the American-led effort in Afghanistan. These are dangerous and simplistic arguments. Afghanistan is a complex
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place in its own right: it has a unique ethnic makeup, geography, social structure, economics, and military factors. It is by no means analogous to Iraq in any
way. Imprecise perceptions, some deliberately constructed, could distort the
reality of the situation in Afghanistan and where the United States stands after
two years of operations there. If we are not clear about what the issues are, we
may create unrealizable expectations about what can be accomplished, with
the kind of subsequent media backlash which is extant in Iraq.

The Critics
Criticism of American Afghanistan policy can best be characterized
as reflexive reactions based on obsolete worldviews combined with juvenile
demands for instantaneous success. If it is not successful by now, it therefore
must be a failure. Some examples: When describing necessarily violent activities undertaken by American-supported anti-Taliban factions, anti-American
journalist Robert Fisk in the Independent (UK) uses phrases like “This is just
how the Americans began in Vietnam,” and asserts that “Afghanistan is on the
brink of another disaster.” Of course, in this view, America is to blame.2 Analyst Jim Lobe penned an article entitled “Afghanistan Quagmire,” in which he
shrilly stated that “Afghanistan is beginning to look like a quagmire rather than
a victory, with echoes of the confusion and uncertainty and persistent bloodshedding of Vietnam.”3
In other cases, organizations with specific interests in the Afghanistan situation have raised criticisms to bolster their proposed policies (and
perhaps potential involvement) without taking into account the wider view
necessary to take in the magnitude of the problems in Afghanistan. Human
Rights Watch demands that the UN-mandated but now NATO-led Kabul
stabilization mission, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),4
should be expanded into other urban centers to provide “greater security” for
reconstruction, the protection of women’s rights, the return of refugees, and
to reign in “regional warlords.”5 Josh Pollack in DFI International’s Current
Defense Analyses argues that heavy weapons must be stored, and combatants
must be demobilized and then be reintegrated into society. ISAF, therefore,
should be expanded and provided with the capability to “stop any Afghan fac-
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tion from playing a spoiler role” while at the same time building up “a capable, centralized, and balanced indigenous military force.”6
The International Crisis Group, like the others, argues that the “international community” must increase ISAF to 25,000 to 30,000 troops and expand it to other population centers to “monitor potential disputes” which could
disrupt the political process. The development of a legal system and a human
rights monitoring mechanism could then be introduced.7 Indeed, after consulting some refugees in Iran, the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research at Harvard University is more than willing to provide detailed if unsolicited advice on how Afghans should run their country, with suggestions
like “the new administration should prevent discrimination against any ethnic
or political group” and “disarm everybody throughout the country.” The implications of these arguments are that some international force should run the
show in Afghanistan, not American-led forces or even the Afghans.8
There are two distinctly conflicting visions of Afghanistan, once
the Vietnam faux-analogists’ unhelpful assertions are discarded. The “ideal”
vision of Afghanistan held by numerous Western observers consists of something which resembles a semi-modernized quasi-European state with a prosperous economy, where there is little or no political violence and everybody’s
human rights are protected by a strong central government which can project
power throughout the territorial confines of what we call Afghanistan.
This vision is tempered by two realities. The first is the impact of
events that the United States put in motion in Afghanistan after 11 September
2001, given the circumstances of Taliban control over the territory of Afghanistan and al Qaeda’s presence in it, leading to the collapse of the regime. The
second reality relates to what the current power brokers in Afghanistan will
allow in the wake of all of this. These two realities will not be altered all of a
sudden by the pronouncements of the pundits and the demands of the NGOs.
Perhaps they should not be radically altered. If we are going to formulate a future American policy and strategy for Afghanistan, we have to operate in the
realm of the possible, keeping in mind that mid-course corrections are not always achievable or even desirable.

The Unfolding Strategy
The close proximity of any analysis of American actions in Afghanistan to unfolding events dictates that we rely on public pronouncements and
media analysis for our understanding. We do not see behind the scenes too
well, despite the release of Bob Woodward’s Bush At War9 and the availability
of information on the internet. American objectives in Afghanistan are, however, clearly stated, if not made widely available. First is the destruction of
al Qaeda’s networks, training camps, stockpiled resources, and communica6
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“The Operation Enduring Freedom campaign in
Afghanistan, in fact, is the complete antithesis
of American involvement in Vietnam.”

tion systems. Second is the destruction of any governing entity providing
support or sanctuary to al Qaeda: this was primarily the Taliban regime.
Third, reconstruction efforts would be undertaken to ensure that international
terrorism could not use Afghanistan and its people as a haven or operating
base in the future.10 Incidentally, American objectives in Vietnam were never
this clearly stated, let alone achieved, particularly in the critical 1963-65
phase of that war. The vague language used at that time indicated that American forces were to “stop communism in South East Asia” and “ train the south
Vietnamese army.”11
The Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) campaign in Afghanistan,
in fact, is the complete antithesis of American involvement in Vietnam in the
1960s. The first phase12 of the war in Afghanistan lasted from approximately 7
October 2001 to 6 or 7 December 2001. In those two months, the first American
objective was achieved with a combination of special operations forces,
anti-Taliban proxy armies, and selective use of airpower to support both. The
irony is that the Taliban regime collapsed far ahead of schedule. Mazar i Sharif,
for example, was expected to hold out well into 2002, as were other urban locations like Herat. US Central Command (CENTCOM) plans originally conceived the first phase as a shaping campaign pending the introduction of
large-scale conventional forces to reduce these strong points alongside the indigenous proxy forces. In early 2002, the equivalent of an airmobile brigade
group was deployed, but this formation was much smaller than the unneeded
but planned-for division or corps-sized options.13
There was some debate among American departments and allies as to
how to achieve the second and third objectives. One school of thought saw
American-led OEF forces completing their offensive operations against al
Qaeda and the Taliban, withdrawing, and then handing over stability operations to a European-led stabilization force, which would first establish itself in
Kabul and then spread to the other population centers. Another school of
thought drew out the transition phase so that both forces coexisted, with the security assistance force slowly replacing OEF forces, perhaps over the course of
a year. In both schools of thought, training cadres from the OEF forces or the
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planned security assistance force would establish the foundations for a multiethnic national army, which would in turn replace the expanded security assistance force around the territorial confines of Afghanistan.14
The rapid collapse of the Taliban, among other factors, threw this debate off the rails. Attempts to deploy British forces to the Kabul region to act
as a stabilization force were blocked by an irate Northern Alliance command.
Subsequent attempts to establish an International Security Assistance Force
in the Kabul area were stymied and delayed, again by the Northern Alliance.
The size and mandate of ISAF were subjected to UN meddling stemming
from the Bonn Agreement, which gave the Northern Alliance a veto over
what the force was capable of doing. At the same time, some in CENTCOM
saw an expanded ISAF as a competitor for OEF forces outside of Kabul, with
all the associated problems of coordinating two separate international forces
in a complex environment.15
The winner of the debate was the US Secretary of Defense. A guiding principle for American planners was to keep the American “footprint” in
Afghanistan as small as possible. Analysis of the Soviet experience indicated
that the larger a foreign force stationed in Afghanistan is, the more targets it
produces, which in turn increases the size and intensity of any insurgent effort
directed against it. The OEF force did not have to expand beyond brigade
group size once the Taliban regime had collapsed. If the 4,500-member ISAF
stabilization force (1,500 combat arms, 3,000 support personnel) expanded
outside of Kabul in the face of indigenous non-Taliban opposition, it would
require substantial American assistance to extract or protect it, which in turn
would increase the size of the footprint.
What emerged from this analysis was that the nature of the second
phase of operations in Afghanistan amounted to a stabilization campaign
conducted by OEF forces rather than ISAF, even though the brigade-sized
ISAF deployed to Kabul in the spring of 2002. The intention was still to hand
off to some other entity, not necessarily an expanded ISAF, once the stabilization phase was complete, but the Iraq situation in late 2002 and early 2003
dominated events and diverted resources.
On the surface, and to media observers, all operations conducted in
Afghanistan since January 2002 look the same. ISAF patrols Kabul alongside
the police forces and exerts control over the Kabul International Airport. OEF
airmobile light infantry, working with special operations forces and indigenous allied forces, hunt any al Qaeda that have slipped through the net and the
remnants of the Taliban regime who are conducting an insurgency along the
southeastern border of Afghanistan. When one examines these operations in
detail, however, it is clear that the geographical area (and the population that
inhabits it) influenced by the Taliban is steadily decreasing, that the number of
8
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American troops on the ground has decreased since January 2002, and that the
ability of the Taliban to launch sizable military actions has substantially decreased from company-sized operations (the size of the forces encountered
during Operation Anaconda in spring 2002) to roughly platoon-sized operations or smaller. In many cases, mines are emplaced and individual rocket attacks are conducted, along with the odd ambush, but the intensity and scale of
activity have noticeably decreased over time. As far as can be determined, no
man-portable, surface-to-air missiles have been successfully deployed against
OEF aircraft. There has been no equivalent repeat of “the Year of the Stinger”16
like that faced by Soviet forces in the 1980s.
As in any war, there are still casualties. For example, in one monthlong period (March 2003) there were two anti-tank mine attacks, one with a
secondary device designed to kill survivors or rescuers; one attack with an improvised explosive device; a successful ambush against a Special Forces patrol, leaving two dead and one wounded; and an unsuccessful ambush against a
convoy from the 82d Airborne. A car-bomb also was detonated in downtown
Kabul, with little effect on its intended target. In all of these instances, OEF
forces and the Afghan Militia Forces tracked down and killed or captured those
responsible. In another case, there was a tragic crash of an HH-60 Pave Hawk
helicopter, which killed all six crew members and medical staff.17
So Afghanistan remains a war with casualties. Media pronouncements that the war is heating up, however, and that a new Taliban-led jihad is in
the offing, are greatly exaggerated.18 Since May 2003, there has been one operation in which the Taliban fielded a force larger than a platoon, but it was defeated by indigenous forces supported with OEF airpower. To suggest that the
activities of Taliban remnants during the latter half of 2003 are somehow the
equivalent of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968 defies reality. Indeed, the
temporary media focus on the low-level attacks made it appear as though there
was some sort of resurgence, when in fact there has been a constant low level of
violence and the media has been preoccupied with other matters like Iraq.
There are no indications thus far that the populations in any area outside of southeastern Afghanistan want the Taliban back in control. In certain
districts of the provinces adjacent to Pakistan, the attitude of the Pashtundominated populations appears to be malleable: they do not necessarily support Taliban rule, but will if it is established or if the allegiance of their local
leaders shifts. On the other hand, if there is an appearance of too much ethnic
Uzbek or ethnic Tajik control from Kabul, it may generate sympathy among
Pashtuns toward their relatives in the Taliban. Efforts are taken by OEF forces
to stave off potential Taliban exploitation of these realities. Whether OEF
forces or other organizations can continue to do this over the long term remains to be seen.
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“To suggest that the activities of Taliban remnants
during the latter half of 2003 are somehow the
equivalent of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam
in 1968 defies reality.”

The violent activity conducted by Taliban remnants and their sympathizers will never completely stop. We should not expect it to. We should
expect, however, that there will be no more large-scale military operations by
enemy forces—that is, anything larger than a ten-man ambush party or, at
worst, some platoon-level equivalent action. We should expect to see the
minimization of enemy attempts at subversion among the civilian population,
particularly the Pashtun populations in southeast Afghanistan.
OEF forces cannot and should not do this alone, however. Indeed,
there have been calls for the rapid expansion of the Afghan National Army
(ANA), and some of its units have worked alongside OEF forces in counterTaliban operations. It will take time, much longer than originally anticipated,
to form a multi-ethnic national army. The other military power in Afghanistan, however, is collectively wielded by the Afghan Militia Forces or AMF.
These are the personal armies of the tribal and ethnic chieftains who fought
the Taliban. Usually called “warlords,” these leaders were integral to successful operations against the Taliban in the first phase of the war. Special operations forces work closely with them to coordinate OEF air and fire support,
conduct tactical training, and provide advice when required. The loyalties of
these chieftains and the people they control and represent can shift for a variety of reasons, as OEF commanders found out during Operation Anaconda in
2002. It is critical that the members of any military force operating in Afghanistan understand, to the extent possible and at all levels, the intricacies of the
tribal relationships and religious affiliations of the groups it interacts with.
Failure to do so will result in the failure of mission objectives at all levels.
Have no doubt: the lines walked by OEF commanders are extremely fine ones
in Afghanistan, and it requires significant agility and political dexterity to
maintain the situation there. There are legitimate grounds for pessimism if
this balancing act fails.
There are competing views as to the role of the chieftains in the future
of Afghanistan. The school of thought that demands a strong central government backed up by the ANA ignores these power brokers at its peril—or worse,
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demands that they be disarmed and tried for human right violations. The chieftains are, in fact, the men who control Afghanistan. They must be part of the solution and made to feel that they are, since it was their people who ultimately
bled to take down the Taliban and al Qaeda alliance. No way has been found to
merge the ANA and the AMF. Indeed, problems similar to those encountered
by Zimbabwe and South Africa in the creation of new armed forces after regime change are minor compared to the ANA-AMF problem.
It is highly unlikely that these chieftains will work with an expanded
ISAF or other international force as closely as they have with the OEF forces.
Indeed, an expanded ISAF will be viewed with suspicion and probably seen
as a precursor force to outright imposition of ANA control and therefore central government control. That is a prescription for renewed civil war, something similar to the events of the post-Soviet, pre-Taliban period in the early
1990s, or worse.
The issue of poppy and drug production on the territory of Afghanistan is extremely difficult to address. What, exactly, is its relationship to the existing power structures? It can be assumed that some chieftains are involved
and use it as a means of revenue generation. Does it in fact drive their actions
and operations or support them? The belief by some that Afghanistan will become the “next Colombia” is, perhaps, exaggerated, but drugs will be a factor
in any future political instability. It appears as though 90 percent of the drugs
and drug products in the region winds up in Europe, not North America; the
other 10 percent is scattered along the way in former Soviet republics. If this is
in fact a European problem, there may have to be a European solution.19 Apparently the heroin extracted from poppies in the region is substandard compared
to similar products produced elsewhere in Asia and is not in as much demand,
at least for the time being. Like terrorism, drug production tends to gravitate toward and find a base in lawless regions. Having inflexible, overly moralistic
policies for dealing with those who deal in drugs may be unrealistic in this environment if there are other priorities.
So where do we stand in early 2004? The first two objectives, the elimination of the Taliban regime and the uprooting of al Qaeda’s base and support
structures in Afghanistan, have been achieved. The third, reconstruction of Afghanistan and its institutions to prevent the re-use of the country as a base for al
Qaeda, is in progress and will take time. It is clear that we must forestall, as long
as possible, a repeat performance of the inter-chieftain civil war which gripped
Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet- and then Russian-backed Najibullah regime in the early 1990s. Can we do that over the long term? There are historical grounds for pessimism: it could be argued that Afghanistan never really
had a strong central government with effective European-style institutions. Expecting such progress within the next five years may be expecting too much.
Spring 2004

11

There is a possibility, a hope raised by many NGOs, that the people of
Afghanistan have had enough of war and instability. Cyclical inter-tribal and
inter-ethnic violence, however, appears endemic to Afghanistan. How do we
prevent that? Can we Western outsiders using our means prevent it? Can we
create enough influence within certain key groupings to prevent it? Can we
build and strengthen a multi-ethnic army and security service before ethnic and
tribal violence starts up again? We are talking about nothing short of societal
transformation—and some will resist it. They will seek outside help, and they
will get it. One possible solution is to hedge our bets by assuming that there will
be another civil war in the future and ensuring that certain chieftains retain
strong connections to the United States. If Afghanistan descends into civil war
again, a repeat performance of the proxy operations conducted in the fall of
2001 can be arranged if it looks like al Qaeda or affiliated organizations are attempting to reestablish themselves in or around Afghanistan.
OEF and ISAF forces are essentially buying time to effect this transformation or at the very least provide a strong base for it. These missions are
doing so with the deployment of foreign troops. The United States has to ensure that it does not keep deploying larger and larger numbers which will
increase the footprint and therefore vulnerability. If OEF and ISAF forces cut
and run too early, the United States will be perceived in some quarters as
having failed to live up to the promises made. The Taliban might reconstitute
itself and bring back al Qaeda, putting us back to square one. If OEF and ISAF
forces stay too long, however, there is a danger of repeating the Soviet experience, or the forces may wind up trapped between competing armies in
another civil war.
To suggest that American policy has failed in Afghanistan because
of these facts is reaching too far and requires substantial amounts of intellectual dishonesty. The only other option was to not attack the Taliban regime
and to avoid any involvement with Afghanistan. Such a course of action was
not a realistic option after the events of 11 September 2001.

Points to Ponder
For those involved in formulating future policy in Afghanistan, and
to those who comment on it, the following observations seem worthy of consideration.
l Most of Afghanistan constitutes a post-Apocalyptic environment
closer to Mad Max: The Road Warrior than to Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.
The ecological damage wrought by the Soviet Union and its puppet government in Kabul is staggering. The ideological and spiritual damage wrought by
the Taliban on the Afghan peoples is the mental equivalent of the drought
caused by the deliberate destruction of irrigation systems and aquifers by So12
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“Essentially, Afghanistan is at the same
Year Zero that Cambodia was at
when the Khmer Rouge were finished.”

viet explosives and tanks. The illiteracy rate approaches 80 to 90 percent.20
Most infrastructure has deteriorated, and there is virtually no industry. In
some cases, “doctors” in remote villages are the second-generation descendants of Western-trained medical people. Essentially, Afghanistan is at the
same Year Zero that Cambodia was at when the Khmer Rouge were finished
implementing their murderous program. Many civil institutions are, in some
cases, led by men in their 70s because they are the only living corporate memory from pre-Soviet times.
l The so-called “warlords” and their violent operating methods are
a reality. It is critical that the more zealous members of international legal
institutions recognize that antagonizing them or calling them to account
under Western legal structures is completely counterproductive to the reconstitution of Afghanistan. We must resist the inclination to be judgmental.
We need to work with them. Those who don’t want to participate will have to
be co-opted, since outright removal will trigger waves of violence that could
wreck what has been built thus far. Constructive engagement could lead to
moderation.
l Democracy and human rights in Afghanistan—by our standards
and by our concept of time—are perhaps not possible in the short term. The
complexities of inter-tribal and inter-ethnic politics in Afghanistan make
Bosnia look like an easy problem to solve. Given the high level of illiteracy
and the probable high levels of political intimidation that will accompany any
Western form of electoral process, the mere concept of democracy cannot be
expressed, let alone take hold in the near term. We need to think in terms of
“modernization” as opposed to “democratization.” The Afghan peoples have
a traditional system: can they modify and update it to satisfy us? Should they?
l A robust OEF force and a robust ISAF force are critical instruments in the ongoing stabilization effort. OEF forces particularly have been
effective at eliminating al Qaeda and Taliban influence in the territorial confines of Afghanistan. They have, in fact, bought time for the stabilization effort. They have prevented Taliban remnants from interfering with the effort in
dramatic ways. They also serve as nascent coercive forces and influences to
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13

keep some elements in line. What we do with those instruments and how that
is received by the Afghans will be an important factor.
l The United Nations has a serious credibility problem in Afghanistan. It is not considered reliable by Afghans generally. In many cases, soldiers from OEF and their accompanying civil-military cooperation efforts are
more effective, but this state of affairs is temporary and related to influence
generation, information gathering, and force protection as much as humanitarian assistance. A handover from the OEF force to some sort of structure
must eventually take place. But what will that be? Who will control it and provide security? The current Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept is
a step in the right direction. By coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance at the province level, “buy in” from provincial chieftains is more
likely than it is with some monolithic UN structure or one run by the
Kabul-based central government. The danger lies in selecting the means to
protect it: OEF, ISAF, ANA, or local AMF? Which will increase the “footprint” to unacceptable levels?
l For the time being, the primary external problem to the Afghanistan effort will be events in Pakistan. Taliban remnants as well as al Qaeda
hide out in certain border regions abutting Afghanistan. The ability of the
Musharraf government to go after and defeat them in detail is questionable
given the volatile nature of the post-9/11 Pakistani political landscape, and
the fragmented and paranoid character of inter-ethnic and tribal problems
within Pakistan’s borders. Ethnic Pashtun tribes straddle the Durand Line
(i.e., the Afghan-Pakistani border) which facilitates a seamless flow of illicit
trade. Obsolete variants of Islam flourish in that region, and it remains a
breeding ground for continuous problems. Northern Alliance suggestions in
Bonn during the fall of 2001 that a UN peacekeeping force be introduced
along the border to guarantee Afghan territorial integrity may emerge, producing a Kashmir-like problem with attendant high levels of violence. The
development of Afghanistan must take into account Pakistan. It may even be
the case that the United States’ Pakistan policy is more important, and that its
Afghan policy becomes an adjunct to it.
l A CIA analyst argued prior to the invasion of Iraq that al Qaeda
“allowed” Afghanistan to collapse so that American forces could be lured
into Afghanistan and bled just as the Soviets had.21 It is evident that al Qaeda
has instead focused its efforts in order to bleed American forces in Iraq. Recognizing, of course, that al Qaeda can attack targets in both areas, Iraq is more
accessible to terrorists and presents more targets for the time being. If the situation in Iraq changes and the American presence is reduced, it is possible
that al Qaeda or affiliates may re-focus their attention on Western forces operating in Afghanistan, be they OEF forces or ISAF forces.
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Conclusion
Determining where the United States should go from here with regard to Afghanistan is no easy task. Selection and maintenance of the aim will
require careful and detailed analysis to avoid what the critics have already
projected into the political consciousness through the media and analytical
community. What is very clear, however, is that the future and fate of the
Afghan peoples will rest on the decisions that they and their leaders take. If
the situation devolves, it will be because choices have been made by those exerting power throughout Afghanistan. To suggest that the United States does
or should exert fine control over those processes is patently incorrect.
We must remember what the primary purpose of the American presence in Afghanistan was and is: the destruction of al Qaeda, its Taliban shield
and support structure, and the prevention of the territory’s use as a sanctuary
for continued al Qaeda operations. So far, those aims have been achieved. The
Vietnam analogy remains, for the time being, the wishful thinking of a small
group of misinformed or misleading pundits.
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